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COMPARABLE WORTH AND THE MARKET 
DEFENSE: A NATIONAL DEBATE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of comparable worth is rooted in a simple pre-
mise: salaries should be based on the intrinsic value of the em-
ployee's work to the employer. l Yet attempts to enact compara-
ble worth measures have caused controversy in state legislatures, 
city boardrooms, and courts.2 Increasingly, the debate has cen-
tered on the market's role in setting wages. Comparable worth 
advocates argue that employers pay women a sex-slanted wage 
which is illegal under Title VII. Employers, in turn, urge that far 
from being discriminatory, such wages reflect the market's work-
ings, and are necessary to their survival.s The defense has hith-
erto proven remarkably successful before the courts. Two recent 
decisions illustrate the ground gained by its advocates. 
On December 14, 1983, in American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees v. Washington (AFSCME 
1),4 a United States District Court ruled that Washington had 
discriminated against approximately 15,500 state employees, at 
least seventy percent of whom were women, by paying them 
twenty percent less than men doing jobs of comparable worth. I) 
1. Comparable worth "call[s] ... for equal pay for male and female .•. [employ-
ees] doing work requiring comparable skill, effort and responsibility under similar work-
ing conditions." Bellack, Comparable Worth: A Practitioner's View, in 1 COMPARABLE 
WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 75, 75 (U.S. Civ. Rts. Comm. ed. 1984). 
2. For a good overview of the debate, see 1 COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 
(U.S. Civ. Rts. Comm. ed. 1984); COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (E. Liv-
ernash ed. 1980). See also Williams, Comparable Worth: Legal Perspectives anaPrece-
dents, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 148 (U.S. Civ. Rts. Comm. ed. 1984). 
"[T]he essence of the doctrine is that compensation should be proportional to the intrin-
sic 'worth' or 'value' of jobs, as measured on some common scale." Id. at 149. 
3. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
4. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), rev'd, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985), peti-
tion for rehearing filed (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1985) (Nos. 84-3569, 84-3590) [hereinafter 
cited as AFSCME 1]. 
5. AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 863. The plaintiffs brought suit as a class of approxi-
mately 15,500 employees. All worked either for the Higher Education Personnel Board 
475 
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The court ordered immediate implementation of a salary sched-
ule based on a 1974 comparable worth study the State had con-
ducted. The court also ordered four years of back pay for each of 
the 15,500 employees affected.6 
On September 4, 1985, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal 
reversed (AFSCME II).' The court held that under Title VII,s 
the plaintiffs had not shown that Washington's salary structure 
had either a discriminatory impact or resulted from intentional 
discrimination.9 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit went further than 
any previous court in accepting the validity of market-based 
wages and characterizing individual employers as passive regis-
ters of market forces.1o 
This Comment is an analysis of the two decisions. It focuses 
on the "market defense" itself11 by examining its validity in the 
context of current trends in wage policy. Also included is a dis-
cussion of its strategic uses by an actual employer and a look at 
the "politics" of comparable worth in Washington and the city 
of San Francisco. 
(HEPB), the State Personnel Board (SPB), or the Department of Personnel (DOP). The 
HEPB has jurisdiction over all those employed in the state's institutions of higher learn-
ing; the SPB and DOP hire and supervise all state agency employees. Id. at 860. 
6. Id. at 871. The order responded to a wage gap of approximately 20% found in 62 
job classifications employing 70% or more women when compared to 59 classifications in 
which 70% or more men worked. Id. at 861. Updates to the study conducted in 1976, 
1979 and 1980 broadening the class showed similar disparities. Id. at 865 n.9. See also 
infra notes 12-14, 20 and accompanying text for relevant discussion. 
7. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Washington, 
770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985), petition for rehearing filed (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1985) (Nos. 
84-3569, 84-3590) (specially remanded to the district court for settlement discussions on 
January 22, 1986; the Ninth Circuit retained jurisdiction for possible rehearing) [herein-
after cited as AFSCME II]. 
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1),(2) (1982). 
9. AFSCME I, 770 F.2d at 1405, 1408. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1),(2)(1982). Title 
VII prohibits employment discrimination using two theories: disparate impact and dispa-
rate treatment. The latter has been read as requiring a showing of intentional discrimi-
nation on the part of the employer. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973). See also International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 
335 n.15 (1977). Under the former, all that is required is a showing by the plaintiff(s) 
that a facially neutral policy not justified by business necessity of the employer's had a 
discriminatory impact on them. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See infra 
notes 48-50 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion. 
10. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1406. 
11. See infra notes 60-73 and accompanying text for an extended discussion on the 
market defense. 
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II. AFSCME I AND II 
A. BACKGROUND 
The American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees union sued the State of Washington after the latter's 
own study showed serious sex-based pay inequity existing in its 
workforce.l2 In 1974, the State of Washington hired Norman 
Willis, a professional management consultant, to evaluate the 
problem.I3 His independent study confirmed a twenty percent 
wage gap between sixty-two female-dominated and fifty-nine 
male-dominated job classes.I4 In two updates, adding eighty-five 
new classifications to the study, the State and Willis both pro-
jected the costs of equalizing state salaries. III In 1977, the State 
amended its compensation statutes,t6 earmarking the necessary 
funds. I7 Each state agency then created a supplemental pay 
schedule using comparable worth principles. Then, in a surplus 
year, Governor Dixie Lee Ray cut the appropriations from the 
budget. IS The State has since been adamant in refusing to im-
plement the new schedules.I9 
12. AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 851. The study was conducted by the HEPB and 
the DOP jointly. On January 8, 1974, the two Boards issued findings which included 
"clear indications of pay differences between [job] classes predominantly held by men 
and those predominantly held by women within the State systems and concluded such 
differences were not due to job worth alone." Id. at 860-61. Both Boards recommended 
further study to measure the pay gap and suggest a remedy. Id. 
13. Id. at 861. Representatives of DOP and HEPB chose the job classifications to be 
studied, and evaluations of each were "arrived at by [the] consensus ... of [members] 
consisting primarily of representatives of State agencies and institutions." Id. 
14. Id. Willis also found that the greater the job worth, the greater was the discrimi-
nation factor. "For jobs evaluated at 100 points, men's pay was 125% of women's pay." 
Id. "For jobs evaluated at 450 points, however, men's pay was 135% that of women's 
.... " Id. -
15. Id. at 861-62. 
16. ld. at 862. 
17.ld. 
18. Id. Although the AFSCME I court did not elaborate on the costs of discrimina-
tion when balanced against those of implementing the comparable worth study, Wash-
ington's governor Dixie Lee Ray did in 1980: "The dollar cost of solution will be high; it 
probably cannot be achieved in one action. But the cost of perpetuating the unfairness 
within State government itself, is too great to put off any longer .... " Id. Despite Ray's 
insight, the State did nothing to remedy the problem until 1983 after the AFSCME I 
class action suit had already been filed. That year the state legislature passed two bills 
calling for full implementation of comparable worth for some of the classes affected by 
June 30, 1993. Id. at 862-63. See also infra note 67 and accompanying text for a fuller 
discussion of the costs of discrimination. 
19. AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 862-64. 
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B. Two PERSPECTIVES ON PAY EQUITY 
The two decisions differ most in perspective. The AFSCME 
I court was the nation's first to accept "comparable worth" as 
viable under Title VIpo That court also rejected the "market 
defense" urged by the State.21 The AFSCME II court followed 
earlier rulings rejecting "comparable worth" principles;22 the 
court favored wages set in response to a variety of market 
forces.23 
1. AFSCME I: The Nation's Interest m Ending Gender 
Discrimination 
In reaching their distinct holdings, both courts focused on 
the State's refusal to implement comparable worth studies it 
had itself commissioned.24 Yet only the AFSCME I court found 
the State's refusal was a violation of Title VII.25 The court's ap-
proach was novel. It linked the existing twenty percent wage gap 
20. Id. at 865-67. Using the 1974 Willis study as its base, the AFSCME I court 
became the first in the country to find that Title VII has been violated when jobs compa-
rable in knowledge and skills, mental demands, accountability and working conditions to 
those predominantly held by men earn less because they are held predominantly by 
women. Id. at 866. Until this decision, it was not clear that Title VII could entertain a 
"comparable worth theory" although the statute could be applied to a wide range of 
discriminatory job practices, including wage discrimination. See generally County of 
Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); Spaulding v. Univ. of Washington, 740 F.2d 
686 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. den., 105 U.S. 511 (1984); Lemons v. City and County of Den-
ver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. den., 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Christensen v. Iowa, 
563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). Although Spaulding, Lemons, and Christensen all reject 
comparable worth as a viable theory under Title VII, all three agree that Title VII has 
broad remedial powers whose exact scope is still unclear. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 699-701; 
Lemons, 620 F.2d at 229; Christensen, 563 F.2d at 355-56. 
21. AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 867. In rejecting Washington'S defense, the 
AFSCME I court chided it for being a government that "in the eighth decade of the 
Twentieth Century [is] attempting to use the American legal system to maintain atti-
tudes and concepts that are no longer acceptable under the provisions of Title VI!." 578 
F. Supp. at 868 n.17. 
22. See Spaulding v. Univ. of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 706-07 (9th Cir. 1984), cert 
den., 105 U.S. 511 (1984); Lemons V. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229-30 
(10th Cir. 1980), cert. den., 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Christensen V. 'Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356-
57 (8th Cir. 1977). 
23. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1407. 
24. Compare AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 860-63 with AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 
1404,1408. 
25. AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 867. 
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to the State's past acts of discrimination.26 The court thus put 
the findings of the Willis study into a broader context-one of 
longstanding discriminatory practices toward women.2'1. The 
court reasoned that existing, intentional patterns of wage dis-
crimination were outgrowths of these former policies28 and the 
product of current wage policy, including the S:tate's seminal de-
cision in 1978 to conduct a comparable worth study.29 In short, 
the AFSCME I court viewed the employer as an actor, playing a 
pivotal role in setting wages.30 
The court also broke ground in rejecting the State's claims 
that implementing the Willis studies would be too costly. The 
court disagreed, finding the nation's interest in ending sex dis-
crimination greater.31 The court held that the latter overrode the 
State's claims of legitimate business necessity in maintaining a 
sex-based wage gap.32 The district court then ordered Washing-
ton to remedy the pay disparity without further delay.33 
26. The court reached into the State's history and the nation's past for examples of 
blatant discriminatory attitudes toward women by government officials. In Washington, 
this included a definition of state citizenship which excluded women and was upheld by 
its highest court in 1888. Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. Terr. 59, 19 P. 135 (1888). The 
Declaration of Independence went even further by failing to mention women at all. 
AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 866 n.ll (citing The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 
1776». 
27 .. The court noted contemporary discriminatory practices by the State which in-
cluded the running of segregated help wanted ads from the 1950's to 1973, setting sala-
ries based on discriminatory criteria, and failing to implement its own findings and rec-
ommendations to correct continuing pay inequity. Id. at 860. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 865-67. 
30. Id. at 865-70. 
31. One of the most interesting things about the AFSCME I decision was its ~mpha­
sis on balancing the defendants' business justifications against the nation's interest in 
ending employment discrimination to see which were overriding. AFSCME I, 578 F. 
Supp. at 856-57 (citing Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297, 1303 (9th Cir. 
1982); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1977». The court 'concluded that ending 
such discrimination has more urgency than any business rationale the state had offered. 
AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 863. 
32. AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 863. The court found the state had "failed to pro-
duce credible, admissible evidence demonstrating a legitimate and overriding business 
justification .... " Id. 
33. Id. at 868, 871. In ordering immediate implementation of the study and back 
pay to 1979 for all 15,500 members of the class, the court pointed to the lessons of Brown 
v. Board of Education, 394 U.S. 294 (1955), and its progeny, namely that to delay a 
remedy was often fatal to its effectiveness. "It is time, right now for a remedy," the court 
concluded. Id. at 868 (emphasis in the original). 
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2. The AFSCME II Decision: The Costs of Pay Equity 
The Ninth Circuit also focused on the Willis studies.34 That 
court, however, saw the studies as merely a part of a complex 
compensation system. The court cited the large number of gov-
ernment hearings, proposals, and recommendations involved in 
formulating state salaries as proof.35 The court, moreover, found 
a variety of equally complex "market forces" shaping the State's 
deliberations.36 In the court's view, the State had done nothing 
more than carry out wage measures dictated by such forces.37 
The State's refusal to implement the Willis studies was thus too 
intricate to label either intentionally discriminatory, or as hav-
ing a disparate impact on women.38 
34. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1403-04, 1406-08. 
35. Id. at 1406. 
36.Id. 
37. Id. Although earlier courts had echoed AFSCME Irs position, none had gone as 
far in focusing its entire decision on the market as an external regulator, largely respon-
sible for wage disparity, rather than on the employer as a wage setter. See generally 
supra note 22. But see California State Employee's Association v. California, No. C-84-
7275 MHP (N.D. Cal. filed May 30, 1985) (Memorandum and Order granting conditional 
class certification) (a recent district court decision setting some limits on the market 
defense). 
38. AFSCME I, 770 F.2d at 1405-06, 1408. The court contrasted the state's wage 
system with specific employment practices such as height and weight requirements, the 
requirement of a high school diploma where one is not needed to adequately perform a 
job, and mandatory maternity leave, and characterized au as facially neutral policies 
having a discriminatory impact under Title VII. The court also found the state's failure 
to implement its studies lacked the requisite animus to support a finding of intentional 
discrimination.Id. at 1406-07; see also supra text accompanying note 36. 
In Gunther, however, a study very similar to that conducted in Washington was 
done by the County of Washington. The study revealed that although female matrons 
working in its jails should have been earning 95% of what male guards were, based on 
the duties of each, the county was paying the matrons only 70% of the wages earned by 
male guards. There, too, the county refused to remedy the wage gap based on its own 
findings. The court accepted the county's failure as evidence of an intent to discriminate 
against its female employees under Title VII. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 
U.S. 161 (1981). 
Interestingly, a recent Minnesota appellate court decision distinguished Gunther on 
the facts above, from a situation in which an employer did implement the findings of job 
evaluation market survey resulting in allegations of sex discrimination under Title VII. 
Bohm v. L.B. Hartz Wholesale Corp., 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 415 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1985). While rejecting comparable worth as a viable theory under Title VII, the 
Bohm court obviously agreed that, among other things, Gunther stands for the proposi-
tion that a failure to implement the findings of an employer's own studies is evidence of 
an intent to discriminate. Id. at 500. AFSCME II, however, clearly rejected that proposi-
tion, despite Gunther. "Assuming, however, that like other job evaluation studies, ... [a 
comparable worth study] ... may be useful as a diagnostic tool, we reject a rule that 
would penalize rather than commend employers for their effort and innovation in under-
6
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The court also found the state-approved wage gap between 
predominately male and female job classes a necessary part of 
legitimate budgetary restraints without, however, citing support-
ing data.39 The court thus implied that closing such a gap was 
cost-prohibitive.40 Finally, the court's silence on the desirability 
of achieving pay equity was striking!l 
In short, the AFSCME II court depicted the marketplace as 
an actor too elusive and complex for Title VII analysis42 and 
characterized the employer as a register too passive to hold lia-
ble!3 AFSCME I differed in its historical perspective, its pas-
sion, and its focus on the employer!4 Taken together, the two 
decisions encompass the flavor and scope of a national debate, 
offering radically differing visions of the economy, the effect of 
the economy on employers and wage-earners, and the issue of 
pay equity. 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARKET DEFENSE 
The "market defense" was not prominent in early Title VII 
wage discrimination cases.45 The landmark County of Washing-
ton v. Gunther46 decision had established that Title VII actions 
can encompass a variety of discriminatory employment practices 
and that such actions were not limited to those alleging unequal 
pay for the same or substantially similar work as that done by 
men. The decision, however, said nothing about the elements of 
a Title VII wage discrimination claim!? Thus, initially, the 
taking ... [it]." AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1408. 
39. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1407. 
40. See AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1408. See also infra notes 60-62 and accompanying 
text for a fuller discussion of this important issue. 
41. The court's only reference to the subject was its observation that Washington 
was not responsible in creating it. AFSCME 11,770 F.2d at 1407. 
42. Id. at 1406 (citing Spaulding v. Univ. of Washington, 740 F.2d at 708 (1984»; 
see also AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at1407-08. 
43. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1408. 
44. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text for relevant discussion. 
45. See generally AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. 840, 856-59; Dean, Comparable Worth, 
in WOMEN AND THE LAW 2-7 to 2-7 to -15 (C. Lefcourt ed. 1984). The latter provides both 
an excellent summary and analysis of the elements of a wage discrimination claim 
brought under Title VII; see also Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 
1125 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing appellate standards of review). 
46. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178-81 (1981). 
47. In affirming for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court specifically declined to rule on 
the merits of the plaintiff's sex discrimination under Title VII, or set "standards for the 
7
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ruling produced an evidentiary battle. The debate centered on 
(1) the evidence necessary to show either disparate impact or 
disparate treatment under Title VII, and (2) which party carried 
the burden of proof in either case.48 While this was a highly 
technical phase of Title VII litigation, plaintiffs did gain signifi-
cant ground. They won the right to bring suit under a variety of 
theories.49 They then tested Title VII's scope-for the first time 
raising comparable worth under the statute. 50 In doing so, the 
plaintiffs contrasted pay based on the intrinsic value of their 
work with wages determined by a sex-slanted market. 51 Defend-
ants responded with claims that they set wages according to le-
gitimate market forces-hence the "market defense."52 In nu-
merous rulings holding for the defendant, the courts agreed, 
depicting market-based salary systems as given. All refused, 
therefore, to hold employers liable for any resulting pay gaps. 53 
further conduct of ... [similar] litigation." Id. at 166. Instead, the Court held only that 
"claims of discriminatory undercompensation are not barred by Section 703(h) of Title 
VII merely because ... [female guards] do not perform work equal to that of male ... 
guards .... " Id. at 181. The Supreme Court in Gunther, "stressing the broad remedial 
purposes of Title VII .•. [also] construed the Bennett Amendment to incorporate into 
Title VII the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act, but not to limit discrimina-
tion suits involving pay to the cause of action provided in the Equal Pay Act." AFSCME 
II, 770 F.2d at 1404 (citing Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168-71). 
48. See AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 857-59, showing how the shifting burdens of 
proof/production are allocated between plaintiff and defendant; see also Dean, supra 
note 45, at 2-8 nn.21, 22-26, 2-9, 2-10 n.40, 2-11, showing ongoing developments in this 
area, including varying judicial interpretations by the courts of the type of evidence nec-
essary to meet such burdens. 
49. AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 856. Both "the availability of disparate impact anal-
ysis" in such cases, and the possibility of "the same set of facts giv[ing] rise to a claim 
under the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories" were originally unclear, 
but subsequently won acceptance by the courts. Id. at 856. 
50. But see Dean, supra note 45, at 2-17 to -18, showing various judicial attempts to 
limit the impact of Gunther, 452 U.S. at 161, particularly in the context of "comparable 
worth" claims. 
51. See generally Spaulding v. Univ. of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 706 (9th Cir. 
1984), cert. den., 105 U.S. 511 (1984); Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 
228, 229 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. den., 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 
353, 355 (8th Cir. 1977). 
52. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. This cluster of cases is presently the 
main theoretical base of the "market defense." In each, the defendants reiterated the 
claim of paying wages based on legitimate market forces, an argument the courts readily 
approved, in holding that any wage gaps (between male and female workers) resulting 
are outside the scope of Title VII's remedial powers. 
53. See Spaulding, 740 2d at 686; Lemons, 620 F.2d at 228; Christensen, 563 F.2d at 
353. 
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In Spaulding v. University of Washington/,4 the court, nev-
ertheless, empl;1asized the poor quality of statistical evidence 
plaintiffs had offered to support their comparable worth argu-
ments. This implied that if more reliable data were presented, 
the court might find the underlying comparable worth argument 
more acceptable. ISIS 
The AFSCME II ruling made it clear that this was not the 
case. Unable to discredit the data gathered in the Willis study, 
that court shifted direction. It found that using any statistical 
data to prove intentional discrimination was suspect without 
further supporting evidence.1SS The shift clarified that the court's 
dislike of comparable worth was a philosophical one.1S7 
Also evident was the shift of the comparable worth debate 
to a scrutiny of the market. Thus far, however, employers have 
provided courts with little more than generalities about the mar-
ket's role in wage setting.lSs Plaintiffs armed with specific find-
ings on the market's actual workings might effectively offset 
54. E.g., Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 703·04. The Spaulding court found the plaintiff's 
wage statistics defective because they were gathered solely within the University of 
Washington (rather than being compared with wages paid by other universities or the 
outside labor market). Id. at 704. The court also emphasized that wages for females 
working in the nursing faculty had not been compared to those of female faculty in other 
departments.ld. Moreover, it complained of research done by paralegals who did not use 
a multiple regression model, an accepted and more sophisticated approach to gathering 
statistical proof of discriminatory treatment and impact. Id. (citing D. BALDUS & J. COLE, 
STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (Supp. 1983); Fisher, Multiple Regression in Le-
gal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 705 (1980». Because the Spaulding COurt de-
cided the statistics were too flawed to be reliable, it "refuse[d] to specify exactly the role 
such comparative statistics play" in wage discrimination cases under Title VII. Id. (em-
phasis added). Note, however, how this finding also reflects the limited financial re-
sources of plaintiffs undertaking such suits, since the more sophisticated the data gath-
ered, the more costly. 
55. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 704. 
56. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1407 (citing Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 703 (1984». "[J]ob 
evaluation studies and comparable worth statistics alone are insufficient to establish the 
requisite inference of discriminatory motive critical to the disparate treatment theory." 
Id. As already noted, however, the Spaulding court refused "to specify exactly what role 
... comparative statistics play ... [because of the unreliability of the plaintiffs' data]." 
AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1407. Thus AFSCME II appears to overstate Spaulding. See 
also Spaulding, 740 F.2d 686, 704. 
57. The AFSCME II court found the comparable worth concept itself had not 
proven to be "a feasible approach to employee compensation [but rather] a matter of 
debate." AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1408. 
58. See infra note 70 and accompanying text for an extended discussion of this com-
plex issue. 
9
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such generalities in court. The result could be a change in judi-
cial perception of the issues involved. 59 
IV. THE MARKET DEFENSE AS STRATEGY 
Employers owe their current success before the courts to an 
insistence that they are economic competitors whose bottom line 
is survival.60 They repeatedly use several techniques to reinforce 
this image. Uniformly in articles and amicus briefs, employers 
emphasize the astronomical costs of comparable worth to the 
Id. 
59.Id. 
60. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Assoc. of Washington Business at 28, AFSCME II. 
Although the fairness of the free market may be debated, the 
market itself is an economic reality that a comparable worth 
study cannot alter. An employer, even if armed with such a 
study, must compete .... [He] must set wages high enough 
to attract and retain qualified workers, but low enough to keep 
production at a competitive level. Thus . . . his decision to 
abide by the market's valuation of a job, rather than that of a 
comparable worth committee, simply reflects an awareness 
that the market is the milieu in which •.. [he] must operate. 
"In structuring wage systems . . . employers . • . regularly take into account the 
need for external competitiveness. For a wage system to be effective, ... it must com-
pensate the jobs within the employer's organization at rates that are competitive with 
... [those] existing in the outside labor market for those jobs." Amicus Curiae Brief of 
the Equal Employment Advisory Council at 16, AFSCME II (emphasis in original). See 
1 COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2; see, e.g., R WILLIAMS & 
L. KESSLER, A CLOSER LOOK AT COMPARABLE WORTH at 39-48 (1984); 0 Neill, An Argu-
ment Against Comparable Worth, in COMPARABLE WORTH; ISSUE FOR THE 80's 177, 184 
(1984) (speaking of the private sector). 
In a letter to Christine Curtis, the chairperson of the Comparable Worth Task 
Force, the President of Federated Employers of the Bay Area, representing 1000 Bay 
Area companies and 25 affiliated associations, also emphasized that "the 'average' em-
ployer in ... [California] has 20 employees ... [while] ..• 94 percent have less than 50 
... and approximately 50 percent employ three or less .... " Letter from J. Arthur 
Lindsay to Christine Curtis at 1. (December 28, 1984) (discussing effect of comparable 
worth on larger employers). He then explained that since his organization represents 
employers only 25% of whom employ less than 50 workers, he is attaching a position 
paper written by a member association representing 50,000 California small businesses. 
Id. at 1-2. The attached paper concluded that implementation of comparable worth 
would place small employers at a competitive disadvantage. Any personnel strategy 
could expose him to the risk of litigation and liability, particularly given the subjective 
nature of job evaluation. J. Sloan Jr., The Practical Consequences of Comparable Worth 
for Small Business 47-49 (December 19, 1984) (unpublished manuscript). 
The aforementioned represents a much more subtle attempt to persuade policy 
makers that comparable worth threatens the survival of both large and small businesses, 
since the arguments Sloan makes for smaller companies somehow reverberate when con-
sidering the larger ones, even though their survival is nowhere discussed in Lindsay's 
letter. 
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employer if enacted: 
[R]egarding the cost to employers if such legisla-
tion should be enacted, it would seem on the sur-
face to be quite simple to calculate. The Bureau 
of National Affairs has estimated it would cost 
$320 billion nationwide for employers to imple-
ment a comparable worth program. A similar esti-
mation for California employers (i.e., total num-
ber of women employed multiplied by an average 
annual rated pay, subtracted from a similar calcu-
lation for men) would result in something 
between $1 and $1.5 billion. These figures, how-
ever, are really quite meaningless and not even 
germane to the issue. It might be more; it might 
be less; it totally ignores administrative and en-
forcement costs .... Moreover, costs have never 
been considered to be a legitimate excuse for dis-
criminating actions that are proscribed by law 
61 
485 
By presenting cumulative, nationwide costs, rather than a 
realistic breakdown of the costs of actual comparable worth pay 
scales, these writings project figures running into the billions.62 
In effect, such literature emphasizes the disastrous effect compa-
rable worth might have on the economy. Employers also tie com-
61. Letter from J. Arthur Lindsay to Christine Curtis, at 5 (December 28, 1984). 
62. Id. at 5. But see Ramey, The Price of Equality, 4 CALIFORNIA LAWYER 27, 34 
(Winter 1984), showing that comparable worth has to date cost employers in the public 
sector only one to five percent of monies spent on personnel and one to two percent of 
their whole budget. See also Rothchild, Overview of Pay Initiatives, 1974-1984, in 1 
COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 119, 122·25 (U.S. Civ. Rts. Comm. ed. 1984). In 
Idaho, $7 million has been distributed in raises to the state's 8,700 classified employees. 
Following a strike by San Jose, California city workers, $1.4 million has been allocated 
over a two year period to supplement a 7.5% overall raise. In Minnesota $21.8 million 
dollars (representing less than four percent of the state's payroll) was allocated over a 
four year period. Costs of implementation to a small municipality might be even lower. 
Princeton, Minnesota, for example, employs 33 workers. After the city created its own 
job evaluation study, six employees were given raises to achieve pay equity. The city 
spent only $10,000 or one-tenth of one percent of the city budget for both the study and 
wage increase. Id. at 123. 
As already noted, Lindsay's letter quoted Bureau of National Affairs figures estimat-
ing the nationwide costs of implementing comparable worth to be $320 billion. See Let-
ter, supra note 61, at 4. Neither the letter, paper, nor any of the literature above pro-
vides any meaningful figures about what the yearly costs of implementing comparable 
worth would be to a single company of a particular size. Id. 
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parable worth to chaos in the workplace.63 Small-business men, 
for example, first extol the "intimacy" existing between staff and 
employer in a smaller workforce. They then predict that unrest 
caused by "comparable worth" salaries would destroy the fabric 
of that intimacy.64 Finally, certain words are often repeated in 
management writings. The word "market," for example, is often 
either itself repeated, or combined with the word "free" in an 
attempt to remind readers that the survival of the "free market" 
economy is at stake.65 
The effect on the courts has been twofold. First, most have 
adopted the market defense as "given" rather than "suspect." 
They have thus ruled a market-based wage gap outside the 
scope of Title VII's remedial powers.66 Second, courts have ac-
cepted a subtle but important language shift-one that empha-
sizes the costs of pay equity and ignores the effect of discrimina-
tory pay gaps on workers.67 That is, pay equity has virtually 
disappeared as an issue, in cases where startling and acknowl-
63. Letter, supra note 60, at 4-7. 
64. Id. But see Letter from Drucilla S. Ramey to Burk E. Deventhal, Esq., Office of 
the City Attorney, San Francisco, at 2 (1983) (discussing the market and comparable 
worth). Ms. Ramey observes that the enactment of "minimum wage laws, child labor 
laws, occupational health and safety laws and ..• anti-discrimination laws ... [were] 
all ... met with ... similar predictions of doom." Id. Critics of Massachusetts' child 
labor act, for example, foretold that it would not only "drive employers from the state, 
[but] destroy harmony between workers and management, and lead the country into 
socialism." Id. at 2 (emphasis added); see also Freed & Polsby, infra note 87, at 1079 
(citing Levin, Comparable Worth: The Feminist Road to Socialism, COMMENTARY 13 
(Sept. 1984). 
28. 
65. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Assoc. of Washington Business, AFSCME II, at 
Title VII was designed to further this policy and enhance the 
free functioning of the employment market by removing dis-
criminatory barriers. Congress' effort to unclog the flow of 
market forces reflects it underlying confidence in the virtues of 
a free market system. The district court's interpretation of Ti-
tle VII, however, distorts the free market . ... Although the 
fairness of the free market may be debated ... [it] is an eco-
nomic reality . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
66. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
67. Sex discrimination has actual, calculable costs. For a survey of the growing liter-
ature on the subject, see Niemi, Sexist Earning Differences-The Cost of Female Sexu-
ality, 36 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 39 (Jan. 1977). The authors argue that women get less value 
for their education than men, with minority women getting the smallest returns for their 
education.ld. See, e.g., Remick, The Comparable Worth Controversy, 10 PUB. PERSON-
NEL MGMT. 371, 372 (1981). 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss3/3
1986] THE MARKET DEFENSE DEBATE 487 
edged pay gaps exist.68 
V. PENETRATING THE MARKET DEFENSE 
The market defense has specific strategic uses which remain 
largely unexplored.69 Moreover, neither the complex nature of 
the marketplace nor the crucial role an equitable wage policy 
plays in its intricate workings have been examined fully.70 
68. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
69. See Risher, Job Evaluation: Problems and Prospects, 61 PERSONNEL 53 (1984). 
Its generalities, for example, tend to obscure specific practices employers use to arrive at 
wages. Job evaluation and its relation to market surveys offers an important example. It 
illustrates that employers shape their companies by choosing among different courses of 
action.Id. 
Risher noted that job evaluation as such is "independent of the decisions that set 
salaries ..• [because] •.. it focuses entirely on internal relative values without regard 
to monetary considerations . • . [in establishing] what is in effect a hierarchy of jobs 
within an organization." Id. at 53. He emphasized that not only do ways of conducting 
job evaluations differ depending on the kind of job, but that "comparing [their] results 
with existing pay rates •.. [results in] replic[ating] existing pay discrimination." Id. at 
55. 
A 1979 National Academy of Sciences study contained similar observations, noting 
that current job evaluation methods have not kept up with the "advances in measure-
ment in social sciences." Id. at 56. It recommended that further research be done to 
modernize such techniques, but fell short of advocating the wholesale scrapping of some 
systems or in favor of a single job evaluation system for the entire country. "[T]he report 
... had a negligible impact on job evaluation practices ... [much to the relief of em-
ployers]." Id. 
Risher's article also offers an excellent summary of how the methods of evaluating 
lower paid positions and higher paid professional jobs differ. Id. at 57. Inexperienced 
practitioners may also contribute to the problem. Risher notes that job evaluation is 
normally considered an entry-level job by organizations. Id. at 58. See also Schwab, Us-
ing Job Evaluation to Obtain Pay Equity, in 1 COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 
83, 88 (U.S. Civ. Rts. Comm. ed. 1984) (showing that job evaluation has a flexibility 
which helps employers address external changes in the market); Steinberg, Identifying 
Wage Discrimination and Implementing Pay Equity Adjustments, in 1 COMPARABLE 
WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 99, 102-03 (U.S. Civ. Rts. Comm. ed. 1984) (discussing differ-
ing methods of conducting job evaluations and how cultural assumptions may affect the 
process); Beatty & Beatty, Some Problems with Contemporary Job Evaluation Systems, 
in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 59 (H. Remick ed. 1984). But cf. Rem-
ick, Dilemmas of Implementation: The Case of Nursing, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND 
WAGE DISCRIMINATION 106 (H. Remick ed. 1984) for ways of constructing job evaluation 
using comparable worth concepts and use of a "single bias-free point factor job evalua-
tion system ... across job families both to rank-order jobs and set salaries .... " Id. 
70. The first important factor is the continuing debate about the nature of the ex-
ternal market. The AFSCME II court calls the market a complex of forces which func-
tion according to the laws of supply and demand. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1406. Our 
notions of the market, however, are based on neither laws nor forces but theoretical as-
sumptions about how the Western economy functions, common to both "classical econ-
omy theory and neoclassical or marginal productivity theory .... " Schwab, supra note 
13
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A. INTERNAL EQUITY 
To compete, employers must attract and keep employees. 
Wages play a central part in this process.71 In this regard, wage 
analysts have for many years stressed the value of "internal eq-
uity," the process of creating fair pay scales within an organiza-
tion.72 By motivating employers to work harder, equitable wages 
69, at 84. 
Contrary to such assumptions, however, a phenomenon known as the "balkanization 
of markets" has been well documented. Id. Simply put, balkanization describes two 
types of markets: those horizontally and vertically structured. In the former, employees 
have a strong commitment to their occupation (e.g., construction trades, medical special-
ties, law and other professions). In the latter, however, a large number of jobs are spe-
cialized and unique to that firm only. Thus, only entry level positions pay according to 
the external market. Id. For the other positions, there is essentially no external market 
and "firms must find some alternative .•. for making wage setting decisions." Id. at 85. 
The firm's discretion in manipulating wages is thus far greater with seniority and merit 
systems playing an important part. Id. See also id. at 91 for a general bibliography on 
the phenomenon of balkanization. 
Personnel guides geared for use by management agree that "internal conditions re-
quire the employer to pay certain jobs above and below the market rate." 14 [Personnel 
Manual) EMPL. COORDINATOR (RIA) 142,101 (Feb. 17, 1986). The same guide also cau-
tions employers to define the market in which they are competing precisely, noting that 
proper definition "will depend on the nature of the business and competition for labor in 
the industry .... " Id. 
71. See infra notes 72-73 for an indepth discussion. 
72. Systems of compensation are, however, becoming more and more sophisticated. 
Where it was formerly thought that structured pay raises motivated employees, person-
nel strategists now favor merit pay, which is an unstructured recognition of superior 
performance. 1 [Compensation) HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. (CCH) 11 10,356 (1983). The 
change is based on the theory that raises serve only to "avoid dissatisfaction." Id. 
"[O)nly when money is paid as a recognition for an individual's outstanding effort .•. 
[and not) ... as a wage in disguise ... [do employees work harder)." Id. 
Merit pay is becoming a pronounced feature of earnings generally, according to a 
1985 survey of 875 firms across the country. Fifteen percent of the firms surveyed have 
merit budgets that are larger than their competitors'. While inflation, collective bargain-
ing agreements, and a concern for profits account for some of the rise, the chief reason 
employers gave for enlarging such budgets was a desire to remain competitive in the 
outside markets. Employer Compensation Practices Studied in Salary Planning Sur-
vey, 89 EMPL. ALERT (RIA), 4 (Nov. 15, 1984) Note that the market itself seems to reflect 
the need for arriving at some form of internal wage equity, a process accomplished by 
constant studies within a company. Wing, Achieving Internal Salary Equity Through 
Job Management, in HANDBOOK OF WAGE AND SALARY ADMINISTRATION 2-19, 2-22 (M. 
Rock ed. 1972). But see also Schwab, supra note 69, at 85. Deciding which employee has 
performed above the norm can, however, be a much more subjective process than award-
ing structured raises, particularly in vertical markets where wages are not determined 
from the outside except for entry level jobs. Id. Courts have recognized the danger by 
requiring "notice to the affected parties, consistency, and objectivity [before they will 
accept a) 'merit system' defense." Freed & Polsby, infra note 88, at 1094 (citing EEOC v. 
Whitin Machine Works, Inc., 635 F.2d 1095, 1097-98 & n.6 (4th Cir. 1980); Brennan v. 
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lead to superior performance which, in turn, raises the em-
ployer's ability to compete.73 Maintaining pay equity has, in 
fact, been a basic, accepted goal of personnel management since 
World War II.74 One theorist, for example, commented that a 
salary structure based on nothing more than a survey of the 
market is an extremist rather than a typical approach to wage-
setting.711 A dramatic example of the ineffectiveness of such pay 
scales is the difficulty of finding nurses and clericals willing to 
work for low wages in the early eighties. Although the pay of-
fered was "competitive" with the external market, it was totally 
ineffective in reducing the ~ritical shortage in both fields.76 
B. TITLE VII LITIGATION AND WAGE POLICY CHANGES 
Employers also show a puzzling ability to restructure wages 
under a threat of costly "comparable worth" litigation. A warn-
ing to employers before the AFSCME II ruling advises: 
"[C]aution: The comparable worth threat to market rate pay 
systems is a point of vulnerability of potentially devastating dis-
ruption and expense. Facing this potential challenge, cautious 
employers might consider instituting an internal mechanism for 
measuring the relative worth of jobs."77 The warning appeared 
in a policy guide tailored to a national audience. The same guide 
suggested that employers limit job evaluation to smaller job 
classes to protect themselves from comparable worth litigation.7s 
Yet immediately following an Illinois ruling rejecting compara-
Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v. Brookhaven 
Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970); ct. 29 C.F.R. § 800.144 (1983) (an informal 
or unwritten merit system may qualify under the statutory language if the standards or 
criteria of the system are applied pursuant to an established plan, the essential terms of 
which have been communicated to employees). 
73. 1 [Compensation] HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. (CCH), supra note 72, at 1110,356. 
The authors do, however, point out that during periods of inflation, wages paid in the 
market may become more important than what is paid to fellow workers within a com-
pany, since buying power and survival in general are at stake. But when inflation slows, 
employees are primarily interested in "what the person sitting next to them is earning." 
ld. The point is that the buying power of the dollar, the market and the economy are 
constantly changing and wage systems reflect those changes. 
74.ld. 
75. Wing, supra note 72, at 2-28 to -29. 
76. Remick, supra note 67, at 372-74. 
77. Job Evaluation, 14 [Personnel Manual] EMPL. COORDINATOR (RIA) 142,076 
(April 1, 1984). 
78.ld. 
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ble worth, another such guide advised that conducting internal 
job evaluation studies was safer. The same manual, however, 
also warned about the continuing threat of AFSCME 1.79 
Thus, litigation which presumably should have nothing 
whatsoever to do with remaining competitive, is affecting em-
ployment wage strategies far more dramatically than any shifts 
in the outside market. This suggests that the cost of lawsuits is 
at least as important as the market in changing wage policy.80 
Also, these manuals illustrate that wage setting is strategic 
rather than passive, active rather than reactive. 
C. THE PITFALLS OF USING STATISTICS TO PROVE WAGE 
DISCRIMINATION 
Ironically, plaintiffs have themselves contributed to the suc-
cess of the "market defense" by an overwhelming reliance on 
statistical evidence of wage discrimination. Because such evi-
dence has become important to arguing Title VII cases, this de-
pendence is understandable.81 The chief drawback of such data, 
however, is the tendency to stress end results rather than the 
atmosphere in which an employer makes decisions. Nor can sta-
tistics capture the particular dynamics of the workplace in which 
discrimination has occurred.82 One reason for this is that statis-
tics work by inference rather than offering specific examples of 
the phenomena they document. Statistics are therefore largely 
incapable of isolating specific instances of wage discrimination.83 
79. District Court Refuses to Extend Title VII to Cover Comparable Worth Claims, 
12 EMPL. Alert (RIA) 2 (Apr. 18, 1985). 
80. Personnel guides such as the above provide a wealth of material, generally fo-
cused on how to make personnel decisions that are litigation-proof. They thus provide 
fertile ground for analysts interested in study of the strategic nature of wage setting. 
81. D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION V, V (Supp. 1984). 
The authors note that the importance of statistical proof has grown steadily between the 
bringing of early Title VII litigation and present second-generation cases. Id. See also 
infra notes 83, 84 and accompanying text. Despite its distrust of the statistics in the case 
before it, the Spaulding court acknowledged their importance in employment discrimi-
nation cases generally although cautioning that they can be exaggerated and distorted. 
Spaulding v. Univ. of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 703 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. den., 105 U.S. 
511 (1984). 
82. "[S]tatistics can provide powerful insight into general or long-run behavior but 
as for a particular decision-and many cases are concerned with just one decision-at 
best it can provide a presumption by inferring from the general to the particular." D. 
BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 81, at 5. 
83. Multiple regression studies, which Spaulding, 740 F.2d 686, 704, favored, for 
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Without such information, it is nearly impossible to determine 
how an employer actually made decisions regarding wages. Al-
though the gathering of statistics is becoming more sophisti-
cated, their reliability remains at issue.84 
The Ninth Circuit has, in fact, noted its distrust of statisti-
cal evidence in proving intentional discrimination under Title 
VII. 85 The court has asked Title VII litigants for current 
ho]examples of discriminatory treatment, refusing to accept his-
torical patterns of discrimination as sufficient.88 Plaintiffs will 
thus have to put more effort into gathering testimonial evidence 
in any case.87 The sooner such efforts begin, the more likely 
plaintiffs are to defeat the market defense. 
Plaintiffs might find the latter approach rewarding for two 
other reasons. Both American and European theorists have 
noted that as governments introduce equal pay legislation, occu-
example, are constructed so that the basic premises (lower wages paid to one sex than 
those paid another) are tested by the injection of numerous variables such as qualifica-
tions, education, etc., which could have legitimately accounted for the inequity. Presum-
ably any remaining gap is unexplained and hints strongly that discriminatory treatment 
is responsible. Fisher, supra note 54, at 722-24. Notice, then, that actual testimony of 
employees, memoranda, or other evidence of actual company policy is never examined in 
such studies. 
84. See Spaulding at 740 F.2d at 704 (citing Fisher, supra note 54, at 702-05). See 
also infra note 87 discussing some potential sources of unreliability. 
85. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1407. 
86. Id. at 1407-08. 
87. See, e.g., Freed & Polsby, Comparable Worth in the Equal Pay Act, 51 U. CHL 
L. REV. 1078, 1081-99 (1984), for a novel approach. While the authors' perspective is a 
conservative one, critical of comparable worth, their methodology may interest advocates 
of pay equity. But cf. Becker, Comparable Worth in Antidiscrimination Legislation: A 
Reply to Freed and Polsby, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1112 (1984). The authors show that it is 
possible to focus on employers' actual decisions rather than trends. Instead of limiting 
themselves to case law or numerical information, they imagine hypothetical scenarios in 
which an advertising executive contemplates paying a female employee less than a male. 
The authors then show the various possibilities underlying the employer's decision (some 
discriminatory, some not). The point is to try to capture the "sense" of the decision, 
rather than just the fact that it was made. 
A telling example of the limits of statistics the authors give is the paradox of "[a] 
statistical [result that] indicates that the difference in average salary between men and 
women is explained completely by differences in such factors as education and experi-
ence." Id. at 1099. "[Despite this exonerating data, however] the employer does not con-
sciously set salaries on the basis of such factors, but rather proceeds on the basis of 
unstructured, unsystematic reactions [or 'gut feelings'] to various employees' qualifica-
tions and productivity." Id. Although his real motivation would fail as a defense, statisti-
cal analysis saves him by not being able to tell the difference. 
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pational segregation increases.88 Apparently this occurs because 
as blatant pay inequity becomes extinct, other discriminatory 
practices arise such as sex-biased job hiring, promotion and job 
classification. While all such practices result in a wage gap, they 
are increasingly more elusive than an outright wage discrep-
ancy.89 One could, of course, consider the market defense just 
such a policy. 
Thus, considering pay equity and remedies such as compa-
rable worth apart from other employment practices gives a 
highly inaccurate picture of the issues involved. In some of the 
more recent "pay inequity" cases for example, plaintiffs have 
also alleged other forms of sex discrimination.90 Stressing the 
presence of such practices may be key to better understanding 
the strategic uses of the market defense. 
VI. THE BOHM V. HARTZ DISSENT: PROVING SEX DIS-
CRIMINATION THROUGH AN IMMERSION IN THE 
WORKPLACE 
A. THE WORKPLACE 
One of the few judicial attempts to focus in detail on the 
workplace in which a pay dispute involving a market survey 
arose is a dissenting opinion in Bohm v. Hartz Wholesale Manu-
facturing CO.,91 a recent Minnesota Court of Appeals decision. 
The defendant, L.B. Hartz Wholesale is a grocery wholesale 
business located in Thief River Falls, Minnesota. By 1980, Hartz 
had employed 125 men and seventeen women. That same year, 
the company conducted a market salary survey which revealed 
that its male warehouse workers were underpaid compared to 
88. Johung, Patterns of Occupational Segregation by Sex in the Labor Market, in 
SEX DISCRIMINATION AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: THE LABOR MARKET AND EMPLOYMENT POL-
ICY 44 (G. Schmid & R. Weitzel eds. 1984). 
89. See, e.g., Spaulding, 704 F.2d at 706 (citing Bryant v. Int'l Schools Services, 
Inc., 675 F.2d 562, 565 (3d Cir. 1982) ("challenge to policy giving unequal employment 
benefits to people hired to work in Iran ... "». 
90. See, e.g., Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984»; 
Taylor v. Charly Brothers, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Lane-
gan-Grimm v. Library Ass'n of Portland, 560 F. Supp. 486 (D. Ore. 1983). 
91. Bohm v. L.B. Hartz Wholesale Corp., 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 495 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
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the average wage for such positions.92 The survey also showed 
that Hartz's unskilled clericals were paid wages higher than the 
market norm. Annual raises were then adjusted downward to 
5.97 percent for the latter category, consisting of fourteen 
women.93 The women worked in five separate departments of 
the company in jobs ranging from clerk-typist to secretary, ac-
counting clerk and bookkeeper.94 
Hartz's non-clerical staff received raises as high as twenty 
percent. All but four of these employees were male. Although 
most worked in Hartz's warehouse assembling, loading and de-
livering groceries to retailers, some had clerical duties very simi-
lar to those held by thirteen out of the seventeen female 
employees. Yet all 125 men were either classified as warehouse 
workers or given special exempt classifications.9 !> 
When Reva Bohm, a female clerical worker affected by the 
pay cut, publicly protested the wage adjustments, she was 
92. ld. at 496. 
93. ld. The survey showed Hartz's clerical workers were earning $6.92 per hour. 
Clericals employed by two other area wholesalers, however, were being paid $6.09 and 
$6.04 per hour. The area's average hourly wage for clericals was determined to be some-
where between $4.34 and $4.78 by-an earlier state survey. ld. The hourly wage of order 
pickers and truck drivers working in Hartz's warehouse was $8.46 and $9.06 respectively. 
Warehouse workers at one area facility earned $9.51. At another they made $8.52 per 
hour. Truck drivers working for the same two employers earned $9.86 and $8.82 hourly. 
ld. 
94. ld. at 502 (Crippen, J. t dissenting). The plaintiff's range of duties contradict the 
notion that she was unskilled. Mter graduating from high school and completing a year-
long secretarial course, the plaintiff, Reva Bohm, was hired as a keypunch operator by 
Hartz in August 1975. From 1976 to March 1981, when she was fired, Bohm worked in 
Hartz's computer and billing or data processing department. There she helped prepare 
master sheets showing routes, deliveries, loadweights and trucks used and kept records of 
the truckers' mileage and hours. In addition, she filed and answered phones. ld. The four 
women not included in the "unskilled clericals" category were classified as junior buyer 
(1), computer operator (2) and "clerical"(l). Their average hourly wage was $7.33. None 
of the four earned as much as any of Hartz's male employees. The two fulltime computer 
operators earned $2.27 an hour less than Hartz's lowest paid male employees. No female 
at Hartz was a salaried employee; twenty males were salaried. ld. at 502-03. 
95. Two males, for example, worked with the plaintiff in the computer and billing 
department. Their jobs included clerical duties, although not identical to the plaintiff's. 
Yet, one man was classified as a "merchandise shipper." The other was classified as a 
"merchandise receiver." Both were thus exempted from the unskilled clerical class. ld. at 
502. In 1980 these two employees were already earning $2.46 an hour more than the 
female "unskilled clericals." The 1981 wage increases promised them a 9.9% increase, 
more than two times the raises the women were to receive. ld. at 502-08. 
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fired.9S Despite these documented practices, the trial court con-
cluded that Hartz had not discriminated against its female em-
ployees on the basis of sex. The court also rejected the plaintiff's 
comparable worth claim under Title VII and found that her fir-
ing was not retaliatory. The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
affirmed.97 
Whether through reluctance or an inability to grasp the sig-
nificance of key facts before it, the Bohm majority refused to 
stray from the surface issues in the case. The court concluded, 
that since Bohm had not filed an Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission complaint until a month after her dismissal, 
her firing could not have been retaliatory.9s Bohm's repeated 
public protests to her supervisor well before the firing, however, 
went unnoticed by the court.99 
There were also glaring signs that the defendant's job 
classifications were discriminatory. The clerical category, which 
was made up entirely of women and included jobs ranging from 
clerk-typist to bookkeeper appeared particularly specious. Men 
working in jobs almost identical to the plaintiff's were classified 
as "merchandise shipper" and "receiver." Yet the court refused 
to examine either category closely. Instead, the court found for 
the defendants, after a cursory discussion of existing job pat-
96. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 497. See also infra note 98 for a more 
extensive discussion. 
97. Id. at 497-501. Bohn, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 500-01. 
98. Bohm filed a sex discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission on April 4, 1981. She had been fired in March of that year. Id. at 497. The 
majority concluded that since Hartz did not receive notice of her charges until some time 
after April 4, her firing could not have been retaliatory. Id. at 498. 
99. Id. at 500. In contrast, the dissent refused to limit itself to the sequence of the 
two events. It looked instead at the atmosphere existing at Hartz before the firing. Its 
detailed portrait of the tensions the 1981 market survey produced among employees and 
management captured the underlying flavor of events leading to Bohm's firing, as no 
statistical study ever could. Id. at 503 (Crippen, J., dissenting). The seven employees of 
the computer and billing department were informed of the 1981 wage increases at a de-
partment meeting held in their supervisor's office in December 1980. The plaintiff pro-
tested to her boss immediately following the announcement. Id. "You can't do that," she 
told her supervisor. Id. She also pointed out that the planned increases would enlarge an 
already existing wage gap between male and female members of the department. Id. 
Following the meeting, she approached her supervisor several more times asking if she 
could speak to Hartz's Board of Directors. According to Bohm, the Board was never 
informed of her wishes. Id. The majority itself admits that "[tJwo months after she con-
fronted Olson," her hours were cut. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 497. One 
month later she was fired. Id. 
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terns in Minnesota/oo and an unquestioning belief in the legiti-
macy of Hartz's market survey. Not surprisingly, the court also 
refused to relate the survey to other actions of the defendant.lol 
The dissent responded by noting that the trial court had 
made two major errors.I02 First, it had misinterpreted the scope 
of Title VII's powers, believing the statute required allegations 
of unequal pay for equal work.los Second, the trial court had 
mistakenly concluded that Hartz's market survey could legiti-
mize discriminatory patterns evident in its wage practices.lo4 
100. [d. at 498. The majority's superficial analysis of these two issues was typical of 
its approach throughout the opinion. Echoing the testimony of a state expert on job 
patterns in northwest Minnesota, the majority concluded the region's workforce was seg-
regated by choice. Ninety to ninety-two percent of the area's clerical applicants were 
women but almost none applied for warehouse positions. [d. at 498. To the majority, the 
above also explained why no women at Hartz, including Bohm, had ever applied to 
transfer to its warehouses, once hired. [d. The latter conclusion is striking given the 
majority's own admission that Hartz's seniority system was structured to deprive any 
employee transferring to any seniority benefits they had acquired. [d. "[The seniority 
system] ... is ... [one] agreed I,lpon by the majority of employees, presumably to 
perpetuate the autonomy of individual departments," the court stated. [d. (emphasis 
added). Note that in 1980, Hartz employed 125 men and 17 women. [d. at 496. Thus, 
even had all 17 women disapproved of the seniority system and voted to change it, they 
could never have come near the majority required. The majority also found that even 
were Hartz's seniority system discriminatory, Bohm had not been harmed as a result, 
since she had never requested a transfer to the higher-paying warehouse jobs. [d. at 499 
(emphasis added). 
101. As with Hartz's seniority system, the majority found legitimate reasons for 
Bohm's dismissal; it was simply the result of necessary economic cutbacks, following the 
loss of three large grocery accounts. [d. at 503 (Crippen, J., dissenting). The majority 
also found the legitimacy of using market factors in setting wages solidly grounded in the 
usual cluster of "market defense" cases. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 500-
01. It concluded there was no pattern of intentional discrimination by the defendants. 
[d. 
102. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 506 (Crippen, J., dissenting). 
103. Because of its belief that Title VII does not encompass claims of unequal pay 
for differing jobs performed by men and women "the court may have failed to recognize 
a lawful basis for any discrimination claim ••.. " [d. at 504. County of Washington v. 
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981), of course, established otherwise, according to the dissent. 
Even before Gunther, the dissent noted, the "equal pay/equal work" doctrine never ex-
isted for cases of discrimination on the basis of race or religion." Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 504 (Crippen, J., dissenting) (citing International Union of Electri-
cal, Radio and Machine Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 
1980). The dissent considered Westinghouse a precursor to Gunther. Bohn, 38 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 504 (Crippen, J., dissenting). Gunther's role was to clarify 
that already prohibited discriminatory wage practices based on race or religion were also 
prohibited on the basis of sex. Thus, the Bennett Amendment's limited function in Title 
VII cases was for the first time established. [d. See also supra note 47 and accompanying 
text. 
104. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 506-07 (Crippen, J., dissenting). To 
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The dissent, however, found that unless a defendant could jus-
tify the taking of a market survey by some business necessity, 
the presence of a survey heightened the suspicion that other dis-
criminatory practices had also occurred.lo5 Bearing out this the-
ory, the dissent linked the Hartz survey to a variety of other 
suspect practices taken by the defendant. lOS 
In the dissent's view, the "unskilled clericals" category into 
which Hartz had placed most of its female employees, was over-
broad, including females with varying skills in a wide range of 
duties.lo7 The defendant's only purpose in establishing the cate-
gory had been to create wage disparity between male and female 
employees. lOS In addition, the 1981 wage increases had clearly 
affected men differently than women. Even before 1981, all of 
Hartz's female employees were being paid less than its .male 
workers.lo9 Moreover, when the plaintiff protested these prac-
tices, she was fired. Her firing was relevant not only to the issue 
of retaliatory discharge, but increased the evidence of the de-
fendant's discriminatory wage practices.llo Essentially, Hartz's 
market survey had only one purpose: to put a ceiling on the al-
ready inequitable wages paid to Hartz's female employees.lll 
the dissent, the circumstances in which a market survey is taken, rather than its results, 
are the crucial thing to examine in Title VII cases. The point is that while some market 
surveys are legitimately used by employers to set competitive salaries, many are taken to 
legitimize already existing and suspect wage disparity. [d. At Hartz, "susnect job classifi-
cations, the firing of an objector and wage disparities for all women ... [accompanied 
Hartz's wage setting practices] .... [T]he evidence [also] showed that market informa-
tion had nothing to do with •.. the firing decision. Likewise, the market does not ex-
plain disparate 1981 raises for female and male clerical workers." [d. at 507. 
105. Id. at 508. 
106. Id. at 502-03. 
107. "The category of 'unskilled clericals' is a specious device that serves to limit 
wages for women; it is 'transparently' discriminatory." [d., at 505 (citing Gunther, 452 
U.S. at 179). See also supra note 95. 
108. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 497-500; see also id. at 505 (Crippen, 
J., dissenting). 
109. [d. at 502-05. 
110. [d. at 505-06. Note that for the dissent, one fact, such as Bohm's dismissal, may 
'raise numerous issues, each of which are linked to the other. The importance of this 
approach is two-fold. First, the connections that different pieces of evidence have to each 
other are stressed, thus enriching the picture of the workplace. Second, the question of a 
plaintiff's potential damages is addressed much more carefully. The dissent would, for 
example, have awarded Bohm damages to remedy the discriminatory wage gap she had 
protested. Id. at 506. But it would also have given a separate and potentially greater 
award for the retaliatory discharge itself. [d. 
111. A Hartz official testified that its market survey showed a wage "ceiling" had 
been reached for the "unskilled clericals" category. [d. at 503. But the defendants pre-
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The plaintiff had therefore presented a prima facie case of both 
intentional sex-based dlscrimination and retaliatory discharge, 
neither of which the defendant had rebutted.ll2 
B. LIMITING THE "MARKET DEFENSE" 
The dissent also severely criticized the "market defense" it-
self for making cases like Bohm possible.ll3 By providing a seem-
ingly rational basis for suspect wage practices, the dissent con-
cluded, market factors act as a convenient screen for employers 
like Hartz.ll4 More important, constant reference to the 
marketplace also distorts Title VII's broad remedial powers. m 
Ground newly gained in County of Washington v. Gunther is 
thus lost to plaintiffs, with devastating results.ll6 
sent no evidence showing that the ceiling had any legitimate business purpose. Id. at 
508-09 (Crippen, J., dissenting). The only other employees on whose wages a ceiling was 
placed were two of Hartz's top salaried officers. Id. at 508. Thus, "market information 
was used to shape ... an inequitable lid on the wages for one class of employees," the 
dissent concluded. Id. 
112. Id. at 506. See also supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. A vigorous de-
bate currently exists as to what constitutes a prima facie Title VII ease. Id. 
113. Id. The dissent focused its criticism on Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th 
Cir. 1977), but the group of Ninth and Tenth Circuit cases, including Lemons v. City and 
County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. den., 449 U.S. 888 (1980) and 
Spaulding v. Univ. of Washington, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. den., 105 U.S. 511 
(1984), also came under its attack. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 508 (Crip-
pen, J., dissenting). The dissent's main point was that County of Washington v. Gunther, 
452 U.S. 161 (1981), decided four years after Christensen and one year after Lemons, 
made the reasoning of the latter "obsolete." Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 507 
(Crippen, J., dissenting). Since "any wage inequality among those in different job catego-
ries can normally be explained by reference to the market." Gunther would become moot 
were such unqualified references allowed. Id. (emphasis added). Christensen was also 
distinguishable on its facts in that there the defendant did not use suspect criteria in 
setting wages. Id. (citing Christensen, 563 F.2d at 354). 
114. Market information simply failed to account for the defendant's numerous sus-
pect actions in Bohm, according to the dissent. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 
507 (Crippen, J., dissenting). 
115. Id. at 507-08. Although Bohm was analyzed by both the majority and the dis-
sent under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, id. at 498-500, the statute is commonly 
construed by applying the principles developed in Title VII litigation. See MINN. STAT. § 
363.03(2) (1984). See also id. at 501-07 (Crippen, J., dissenting). Moreover, Title VII's 
broad purpose of ending discrimination is also in direct conflict with exonerate defend-
ants who can point to the marketplace to explain discriminatory wage practices that 
"'reflect' the social or economic practices in the community," according to the dissent. 
Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 507 (Crippen, J., dissenting). 
116. Errors of analysis, such as those made by both the trial court and the majority 
in Bohm would cut off any remedy to plaintiffs with valid causes of action under Title 
VII. Id. at 509. 
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For these reasons, the dissent proposed severely limiting the 
"market defense" in two ways. In disparate impact claims, the 
dissent would require that defendants show a legitimate busi-
ness need for the use of market factors to justify otherwise dis-
criminatory wage practices.ll7 Second, it would require a much 
more thorough probing of any justification offered by a Title VII 
defendant for an apparent sex-based wage gap.1l8 
The dissent's final insight was its most innovative. Accord-
ing to the dissent, the Gunther decision, establishing that Title 
VII actions may include allegations of unequal pay for different 
work, opened new territory that falls somewhere between an ac-
ceptance of "pure" comparable worth and the doctrine of equal 
pay for equal work.1l9 Cases arising in this unexplored area call 
for rigorous, individualized analysis. This is particularly true 
when, as in Bohm, an employer has set wages without using any 
objective criteria.120 . 
But the dissent also warned plaintiffs to stop clinging to the 
comparable worth banner. The dissent instead urged plaintiffs 
to point to specific discriminatory practices by the employer 
when alleging wage discrimination.121 The Bohm dissent, there-
fore, provides the first judicial suggestion of how to break 
through the tangle of rhetoric surrounding the comparable 
worth issue.122 For the first time, the market defense is firmly 
117. Id. at 507 (citing Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 468 n.4 (8th 
Cir. 1984». To the dissent, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), was the key 
to examining disparate impact claims. Under Griggs, any practice which though neutral 
on its face has a discriminatory impact is forbidden unless a defendant can show a spe-
cific necessity for it. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 507 (Crippen, J., dissent-
, ing) (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424». In Craik, the defendant was able to make such a 
showing; all male job categories given wage increases were shown to be ones for which it 
was very difficult to recruit properly qualified staff). Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) at 507 (citing Craik, 31 F.2d at 465). 
118. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 508 (Crippen, J., dissenting) (citing 
Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 402 n.3 (1979». 
119. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 509 (Crippen, J., dissenting). 
120.Id. 
121. Id. 
122. One of the greatest stumbling blocks to separating out the legitimate uses of 
market factors to structure wages from ones which are a pretext for wage discrimination 
is the overwhelming amount of rhetoric both sides in the comparable worth debate have 
thrown at the courts. See supra note 60 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion. 
Courts have perpetuated the problem by paying a parrot-like homage to the language of 
the briefs they favor. The author examined a series of amicus briefs filed with the Ninth 
Circuit which the AFSCME II court considered in writing its opinion. Their advocacy 
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linked to other discriminatory practices by the kind of objective 
analysis courts have repeatedly asked for in this area. 
VI. A NOTE ON SAN FRANCISCO AND COMPARABLE 
WORTH: A COMPARISON WITH AFSCME 
On November 5, 1985, the City of San Francisco's voters be-
came the first in the country to defeat comparable worth on the 
ballot.123 Proposition E asked voters to repeal a city ordinance 
granting a five-dollar-a-day "meal allowance" to 7,000 of the 
city's lowest paid workers,124 predominantly women and 
minorities.125 Dianne Feinstein, San Francisco's current mayor, 
simply found its way undigested into the court's decision. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of Ass'n 
of Washington Business, at 28, AFSCME II; AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1407-08. The 
AFSCME I court was also guilty of forsaking factual analysis for rhetoric. Although its 
passion is a welcome element in addressing pay inequity, the court could clearly have 
done a better job in marshalling the many factual details presented to it by both the 
plaintiffs. By not doing so, the earlier court left itself open to the AFSCME II court's 
charges that the plaintiffs had presented only "isolated incidents of sex segregation as 
evidence of a history of sex-based wage discrimination." AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1407-
08 (citing AFSCME I, 568 F. Supp. at 860). The plaintiffs had, in fact, presented a de-
tailed portrait of Washington's discriminatory practices beginning at the turn of the cen-
tury up to and including the Willis studies, Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at 10-11, 
AFSCME II (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1985). Also crucial to their case was ample evidence that 
the defendants did not use the results of their own market surveys in structuring wages. 
Id. at i. Incredibly, the AFSCME I court failed to include this evidence in its finding for 
the plaintiffs. AFSCME I, 568 F. Supp. at 860; see also AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1405-
06. 
123. The November fifth city ballot was part of a state-wide election held in 1985. 
Seven propositions, including Proposition E, were presented to San Francisco voters for 
their approval or rejection. San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 1, 1985, at I, col. 5. 
Id. 
124. San Francisco, Cal., Proposition E (Nov. 1985), read in pertinent part: 
Section 1. Ordinance No. 170-85, Part II. Salary Standardiza-
tion Ordinance for Fiscal Year 1985-86, providing a meal al-
lowance for certain City Employees, is hereby repealed. In do-
ing so, the People of San Francisco reaffirm and recognize that 
the City and County of San Francisco may not provide any 
compensation to its employees for services rendered except 
under the San Francisco Charter Sections 8.401 et seq. Any 
reserve of monies designated to implement a meal allowance 
or other premium payments not authorized by Ordinance No. 
164-85 Part I shall be rescinded. 
125. The 13 city classes selected to receive the meal allowance were composed of 
female and minority dominated staff earning less than $26,000 a year. Walsh, The Com-
parable Worth Conundrum, San Francisco Bay Guardian, Oct. 16, 1985, at 11, col. 2. 
They included the following job classifications: clerk stenographer; data entry operator; 
licensed vocational nurse; food service workers; dietition; laundry workers, eligibility 
worker, social worker; librarian and health worker I-IV. Position Paper from the offices 
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placed the measure on the ballot on June 27, 1985.126 Her deci-
sion ; followed a series of events whose often incomprehensible 
twists and turns are typical of high stakes political 
maneuvering.127 
At first glance, the city's ballot controversy has little in 
common with Washington's drawn-out court battles. Yet, the in-
equitable wage practices out of which both controversies grew 
show a striking similarity. So similar is wage policy in the two 
jurisdictions that it raises the likelihood of certain endemic pat-
terns of wage discrimination being common to the public sector 
as a whole.128 Even more troubling is the relation of these 
of the Hon. Nancy Walker (Sept. 21, 1985) (discussing Pay Equity History and the 
Memorandum of Understanding reached between the City and SEIU on May 13, 1985) 
[hereinafter cited as Position Paper]. See also infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. 
126. The initiative was placed on the City Ballot by Dianne Feinstein, San Fran-
cisco's current Mayor, on June 27, 1985. 
127. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text. 
128. A recent class action suit brought by the California State Employees Associa-
tion as well as various individual employees against the State of California offers further 
proof of discriminatory patterns common to the public sector. The suit is still in the 
discovery phase. Thus the entire range and variety of the discriminatory practices the 
plaintiffs allege is not entirely clear. . 
In their Statement of Factual and Legal Theories presented to the district court in 
support of class certification, the plaintiffs put forth allegations already fanllliar from the 
two AFSCME suits and the ongoing controversy in San Francisco. First, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the "[d]efendants do not now and never have followed the 'market' in set-
ting wage rates." California State Employees' Association v. California, No. C-84-7275 
MHP 1, 2 n.2. (N.D. Cal. filed May 30, 1985) [hereinafter cited as CSEA]. Second, they 
recited a series of alleged State practices that are almost identical to those practiced in 
Washington. They include the segregation of California's workforce using "sex-segre-
gated . . . ads, job bulletins, as well as discriminatory restrictions on promotions and 
transfers .... " Id. at 1. As had happened in Washington, an official report to the State 
Legislature found an estimated wage gap of 22% to 26% between the State's male and 
female dominated job classes. Id. at 6 (citing Report of the Senate Office of Research 
(1984». As in Washington, this report recommended that further study be undertaken to 
determine how pay equity could be achieved for the State's workforce. CSEA at 1. In 
1984, the Legislature voted to appropriate $77 million for the express purpose of elimi-
nating sex-based wage discrimination but the Governor vetoed both the appropriation 
and 1981 legislation (SB 1701) which would have created a Pay Equity Commission to 
determine specifically which female-dominated job classes are undervalued. Id. 
In certifying the class, Judge Marilyn Patel ruled that the AFSCME II decision does 
not preclude causes of action brought under Title VII which allege intentional wage dis-
crimination even though such discrimination may have had its origin "in market 
rates." Memorandum and Order Granting Conditional Class Certification, CSEA at 
27 n.l. (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 1985) (emphasis in original). Judge Patel noted that 
"[d]iscriminatory motive is the very evil to which Title VII is directed. While plaintiffs 
may have a difficult time establishing intent, they have made sufficient allegations ena-
bling them to try." Id. That is, the fact that a defendant's discriminatory motive is 
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patterns to the market defense. Recent data show that while 
both jurisdictions justify an admitted wage can affecting certain 
job classes by point to market forces, neither sector actually fol-
lows the market in setting salaries.129 In short, both jurisdictions 
currently use the market defense as a pretext for widespread 
wage discrimination. A detailed examination of the criteria both 
the City of San Francisco and Washington State traditionally 
use reveals how these discriminatory practices have evolved. 
A. INDEXING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Theoretically, the first step in setting wages in both jurisdic-
tions is a process called benchmarking. Benchmarking is a selec-
tion of key job classes within certain occupations. These classes 
are then surveyed in the market. The survey establishes what 
employers in the area are paying for each class. This gives an 
employer a detailed salary range to choose from in paying his or 
her own workers.13o 
In practice, however, most wages are not set by benchmark-
ing. Instead, a process called indexing is most frequently used.131 
Indexing is a clustering of jobs around a benchmark classifica-
tion. Its primary purpose in both jurisdictions is to reproduce an 
internal alignment in each department or agency. The pay for an 
indexed job results from comparing it to what is paid for a 
benchmark position. But the recommended salary for the former 
may vary dramatically from that paid its benchmark.132 Wash-
rooted in the market defense does not by itself take his or her actions outside the scope 
of Title VII. Id. The parties filed a preliminary statement to a joint status conference on 
March 17, 1986.Id. The plaintiff reiterated a request to conduct a six-month "compara-
ble worth" job evaluation which included a request to observe classified employees at 
work.ld. at 8. The state declared an intent "to seek a definitive ruling" on the viability 
of comparable worth and the use of disparate impact to show wage discrimination under 
Title VII. Id. at 3. Given AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1401, American Nurse's Ass'n v. 
Illinois, No. 85-1766 (7th Cir. Feb. 18, 1986) and the instant case, the CSEA outcome 
promises to both test and shape future Title VII litigation. See also 1 California Women 
1, 3 (California Comm'n on the Status of Women ed. 1986) (summarizing the Task 
Force's majority and minority reports on comparable worth and job class studies). 
129. See infra notes 130-42 and accompanying text for an extended discussion. 
130. Appellee's Brief at 27, AFSCME II; Report of the Service Employees Interna-
tional Union-City Committee on Comparable Worth to the San Francisco Board of Su-
pervisors, Phase One 1, 21 (Dec. 1984) [hereinafter cited as SEIU Report]. 
131. Appellee's Brief at 27, AFSCME II; SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 21. 
132. Appellee's Brief at 27-30, AFSCME II. "[T]he ... recommended salary for the 
'indexed' job may be set above, below or at the same level as the selected benchmark." 
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ington sets ninety-seven percent of its salaries by indexing. San 
Francisco derives ninety-five percent of its wages the same way. 
In practice, then, market salaries are largely irrelevant to the 
wage-setting process. Hence both jurisdictions virtually ignore 
them. l33 
B. UNWRITTEN DISCRETION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Without the check of the outside market, salaries are left to 
be set using discretionary and often irrational customs deeply 
rooted within each department or agency. Almost nothing exists 
in writing, either in San Francisco or in Washington, setting 
standards or even guidelines to be used either in indexing jobs 
or in benchmarking. Instead, Washington's personnel boards 
and San Francisco's Civil Service Commission routinely adjust 
or abolish benchmarks altogether.l34 They also remove and add 
jobs clustered around a benchmark.l3C> Wages paid for several 
benchmark jobs are also averaged to arrive at salaries. In Wash-
ington, where two personnel boards conduct separate indexing 
procedures, the same jobs may often be indexed to different 
benchmarks.l3s Finally, both Washington and San Francisco 
have wide discretion in deciding whether or not to refer to mar-
ket rates for the few jobs they have surveyed.137 
In San Francisco, the City Charter mandates an annual sal-
Id. at 27 SEIU Report, supra note 129, at 21-27. 
133. Appellee's Brief at 25-35, AFSCME II; SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 21. In 
San Francisco, only 60 out of 1600 benchmark classes are even surveyed in the market. 
SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 21. In Washington, "indexing" takes place well before 
any market surveys are conducted to prevent market'rates from influencing the process. 
Appellee's Brief at 27, AFSCME II. In San Francisco, the relation between indexed jobs 
and the market is more complex. "[Indexed] classifications determined to be out of 
alignment, based either on the internal market (salary relationships between jobs within 
the city) or the external market ... may be moved to a new place on the benchmark or 
reallocated to a different [one] .... " SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 22. 
134. Appellee's Brief at 30-35, AFSCME II; SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 16, 20, 
23. 
135. Appellee's Brief at 30, AFSCME II; SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 24-25. 
136. Appellee's Brief at 28, AFSCME II. This is true for more than one third of all 
jobs existing at the two Boards. For example, while DOP pilots are "indexed to the Auto-
motive Mechanic benchmark ... [HEPB pilots are indexed] to the Research Technolo-
gist benchmark." Id. Each benchmark pays a different salary. Id. 
137. Appellee's Brief at 28, AFSCME II. Deviations from market rates also occur to 
preserve historical and internal relationships, within the two state agencies. Id. SEIU 
Report, supra note 130, at 22. 
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ary standardization process using strict formulae based on like 
work and service. Nevertheless, the city's Civil Service Commis-
sion routinely refers to wages being paid in other jurisdictions 
before deciding its own departments' salaries. Commission staff 
also compares wages earned by certain city classes to classes in 
other city departments, adjusting salaries accordingly while ap-
parently ignoring charter formulae.13s 
In both jurisdictions, the foregoing practices perpetuate bla-
tantly sex-based wage gaps. At least some of these gaps result 
from indexing female dominated jobs to female benchmarks and 
male to male.139 The AFSCME plaintiffs uncovered startling ap-
plications of this policy. It would seem logical, for example, for 
Washington to index the predominantly female Campus Police 
Assistant classification to the Security Guard benchmark. But 
since the latter is a predominantly male benchmark class earn-
ing a higher salary, Washington instead indexes the Campus Po-
lice Assistants to a clerical benchmark also predominantly fe-
male. Even more startling is the fact that State Beauticians are 
indexed to the same benchmark as State Barbers, ranked two 
pay ranges below the Barber class; this results in an unexplained 
pay gap that is totally arbitrary.14o 
Similar indexing maneuvers occur in San Francisco.141 The 
most interesting and subtle technique is the Multiple Bench-
mark System for the city's executives. By tying about 150 top 
positions to several city benchmarks instead of just one, and 
averaging the wage earned by each, the city again arbitrarily 
succeeds in raising a few chosen salaries. Seventy-five percent of 
these officials are men. Ninety-five percent are white.142 
C. THE POLITICS OF KEEPING THE PEACE 
Many of the wage practices just detailed have been aptly 
described as ways of "keep[ing] the peace" within the public 
sector.143 Achieving peace is, however, an intensely political pro-
138. SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 22-23. 
139. Appellee's Brief at 29, AFSCME II; SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 26. 
140. Appellee's Brief at 29, AFSCME II. 
141. SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 26. 
142. Id. at 26-28. 
143. Appellee's Brief at 29, AFSCME II. 
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cess in both jurisdictions. In Washington, the "politics" of ad-
justing salaries commences as soon as the preliminary internal 
adjustment described above ends and staff have reported to per-
sonnel board members. Almost immediately a variety of groups 
approach the board, lobbying its members to drop certain 
benchmarks, select others and raise salaries of various indexed 
jobs.u4 Board members, all political appointees, also trade votes 
with one another in deciding which indexed positions deserve 
raises: 
One former Board member testified that Board 
members swapped votes on decisions to deviate 
from the survey, promising support from one job 
rate in return for support for another . . . one 
Board member supported an increase for dental 
hygienists because his daughter-in-law was a den-
tal hygienist and worked hard .... 145 
In San Francisco, too, employers, unions, city departments 
and even other members of the city's civil service approach the 
Commission's staff all seeking various wage adjustments for cer-
tain job classes. About forty to fifty such requests are imple-
mented annually.146 
Although this Comment has focused on the politics occur-
ring at the administrative level, elected officials in both jurisdic-
tions are involved, thereby increasing political pressures to ad-
just salaries. Washington personnel boards are empowered to 
make salary recommendations only some of which the State 
Legislature may choose to enact. Once this body receives the 
board's recommendations, therefore, a second round of lobbying 
begins, this time directed at legislators. In its "cost-justification 
defense" in AFSCME I, the State presented some evidence of 
the scope of such lobbying efforts in the years immediately prior 
to the AFSCME decision.147 The State cited promises to the for-
est industry and its Prison Boards .. 
144. Id. at 30. "[O]rganizations' ... manager[s] ... and classified employees" are 
all free to ask for additional salary adjustments at public hearings held by both Boards. 
Each may then adopt any changes suggested or propose salaries of its own. Id. at 30. 
145. Id. at 31. 
146. SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 24. 
147. AFSCME I, 568 F. Supp. at 867. 
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State officials emphasized budgetary promises to ensure ad-
equate delivery of social services and education to its resi-
dents.148 The State also expressed great concern for achieving a 
balanced budget and predicted unrest among employees result-
ing from the Willis studies.149 The State saw the fiscal priorities 
as more important than achieving pay equity for its own 
workforce. 
D. SAN FRANCISCO: THE CITY CHARTER, "MEAL ALLowANCES" 
AND COMPARABLE WORTH 
In 1984, one could not have predicted that a year later the 
city's voters would repeal a comparable worth ordinance passed 
by the city's Board of Supervisors.llSo Nor could anyone have 
guessed that Dianne Feinstein, the city's mayor, would be the 
one to place the repeal initiative on the ballot.11S1 
By 1984, two studies had already been conducted showing 
the high level of job segregation, both by sex and by race, that 
existed among city and county employees.11S2 Feinstein re-
sponded sympathetically, for the first time supporting city and 
union negotiators attempting to draft a pay schedule based on 
comparable worth principles for all city employees.11S3 She ap-
pointed a task force to advise her on pay equity issues.154 At an 
148. That court found all just justifications to be "without merit." [d. 
149. [d. But see Letter, supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
150. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 158-59 and 
accompanying text. 
151. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ORDINANCE 
170-85 (1985-86) (Part II, Salary Standardization Ordinance, repealed 1985) provided a 
five-dollar-a-day meal allowance to 7,000 City workers (predominantly minority and 
women). 
152. See SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 12 (citing WOMEN LmRARY WORKERS' 
STUDY, COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1978»; see also SEIU Report, supra note 
130, at 13-15 (citing SAN FRANcIsco COMPARABLE WORTH COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS' LEGISLATIVE AND PERSONNEL COMMITTEE (1981». The 1978 study 
found that workers in predominantly male classifications earned approximately 74% 
more per month than those in predominantly female ones. SEIU Report, supra note 130, 
at 12. "[Sixty-nine percent] of city job classifications had no female incumbents ..•. 
[T]he 1981 Report cited similar patterns, noting that earnings of women and minorities 
were depressed further by their disproportionate representation among temporary em-
ployees .... n [d. at 14. 
153. 'See SEIU Report, supra note 130 at 1 app.B (citing OFFICE OF THE MAyoR, SAN 
FRANCISCO, POSITION ON EQUAL PAY FOR COMPARABLE WORTH (1984». 
154. SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 1. See also OFFICE OF CONTROLLER, SAN FRAN-
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annual Conference of Mayors, Feinstein successfully lobbied 
fellow delegates for an endorsement of comparable worth at the 
national level. l55 Her efforts gave her new credibility as a femi-
nist.156 Since then, however, she and the city's Board of Supervi-
sor's have been deadlocked in a public and increasingly bitter 
controversy about how to implement comparable worth. 
Unlike the legal battle in Washington, which focused on the 
Legislature's actions, the San Francisco disagreement is based 
on varying interpretations of the City Charter. It revolves 
around the ability of the Kleh Actl57 to override the Charter by 
creating a legislative mandate to set municipal and county sala-
CISCO, COMPARABLE WORTH ESTIMATES 1, 2 (Sept. 7, 1984) (acknowledging significant 
wage disparities but concluding that the cost of full implementation of comparable worth 
will make achieving parity difficult). 
155. SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 1 app. C (citing U.S. Conf. of Mayors Res. 
(June, 1984», resolved: 
[d. 
that the U.S. Conference of Mayors urges cities and other gov-
ernmental jurisdictions to undertake their own efforts to ad-
dress any existing pay inequities within their jurisdictions. . . 
[and] ... that the U.S. Conference of Mayors calls upon the 
Congress, the Administration, the States and the Courts to 
study further the issues raised by 'comparable worth' with 
particular attention to ways any existing pay inequities can be 
addressed in a prompt, orderly and fiscally responsible 
manner. 
156. The resolution passed a month before the 1984 Democratic Convention, during 
which Geraldine Ferraro becanxe the first female vice-presidential candidate in the na-
tion's history. Feinstein had also been a serious contender for the nomination. Morrow, 
Why Not a Woman?, TIME, June 4, 1984, at 18-19. See also Doermer, The Pride at San 
Francisco, TIME, June 4, 1984, at 26-27. The backing of feminist leaders was thus cru-
cial to her candidacy. 
157. CAL. GOV'T CODE §53248 (West 1983) provides: 
No local agency shall adopt or continue in effect an ordinance 
or policy which prohibits consideration of comparability of the 
value of work as one of the factors which may be used during 
the collective-bargaining process to negotiate salaries. Existing 
memoranda of understanding, presently in effect, would con-
tinue to control until they expire. Thereafter, there shall be 
negotiations in accordance with this article. 
[d. The preceding section of the same code also provides that: 
As used in this article, "local agency" means any county, city, 
city and county, including any charter county, city or city and 
county, and any district, school district, municipal or public 
corporation, political subdivision, or public agency of the 
state, or any instrumentality of one or more of any such 
agencies. 
[d. Ct. SAN FRANcIsco CITY CHARTER §§8.400(a)-8.407. 
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ries using a comparable worth standard. 
On March 18, 1985, the Board of Supervisors passed a Sal-
ary Standardization Ordinance based on comparable worth prin-
ciples. The measure has become widely known as the "meal 
allowance" proposal.158 Even before asking the city's voters for 
repeal of the ordinance, the mayor had already made known her 
displeasure by twice vetoing it.159 The reasons for the mayor's 
dramatic shift of position merit further attention. 
1. "Meal Allowance" or Pay Equity Funds 
In her campaign against the Salary Standardization Ordi-
nance, the Mayor always identified the Board of Supervisors as 
its authors.160 But in fact, the idea of using a meal allowance to 
achieve pay equity belongs to the Civil Service Commission. The 
Commission raised the proposal with the mayor in a letter from 
John Walsh, the Commission's General Manager for Person-
nel.161 Walsh described the meal allowance to the mayor as one 
of three options legally available to her and the Board for 
achieving pay equity without a formal amendment to the Char-
158. SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 4 app. B (citing SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ORDI-
NANCE 170-85 (1985-86) (Part II, Salary Standardization Ordinance, repealed 1985». The 
latter provides in pertinent part: 
[d. 
Section 1. Meal Allowance 
All full time employees in classifications related to the 
benchmarks set forth below and in classifications 2585, 2586, 
2587 and 2588, having a salary schedule of 44.7 or less, shall be 
paid a $5.00 per day meal allowance in addition to their regu-
lar salary. This allowance shall be paid to the employee as a 
part of his/her regular paycheck. If, for whatever reason, the 
City is not able or permitted to make these payments, the City 
agrees to set aside or reserve $8,800,000 in FY 1985-86 for the 
purpose of making payments to these classifications in some 
fashion at a later time. This provision shall be subject to the 
budgetary and fiscal limitations of the Charter. 
159. [d. at 2, 6-8. The mayor vetoed the ordinance on March 29, 1985 and August 
22, 1985. The Board of Supervisors overrode her veto on April 11, 1985. [d. at 5; see also 
infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion. On June 27, 1985, The 
mayor placed Proposition E, asking for the ordinance's repeal on the fall ballot. 
160. [d. 
161. See Position Paper, supra note 125 (citing Letter from John J. Walsh, General 
manager, Personnel, to the Hon. Diane Feinstein, Mayor, 1 (Feb. 28, 1985» (suggesting 
several means of achieving pay equity without violating the City Charter). 
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ter.I62 His proposal included the passage of a resolution favoring 
pay equity which the mayor signed,I63 but the Commission re-
fused to implement. 164 
The Commission's letter set off a new round of negotiations 
between the city employees and the city. On March 8, the Ser-
vice Employee's International Union (SEIU) proposed a five 
percent salary increase for 7,000 of the city's female and minor-
ity workers for 1985-86, and an additional five percent salary in-
crease for 1987. The city responded by proposing the meal allow-
ance as a way of granting the raises. By March 11, union and 
city negotiators agreed to convert the five percent increases to a 
dollar amount to be paid as a meal allowance.I61> But on March 
12, George Agnost, City Attorney, decided the allowance was il-
legal under the City Charter.I66 
In response to the City Attorney's ruling, contract negotia-
tors deleted the allowance from the tentative agreement between 
the city and the union substituting a pay equity fund instead. 
On June 27, 1985, Proposal E went on the ballot;I67 on Septem-
ber 18, 1985, the SEIU filed an injunction in San Francisco Su-
perior Court seeking to stop Proposition E from going on the fall 
ballot. The union argued that in reality the mayor wanted voters 
to reject the pay equity fund agreed upon between it and the 
city, rather than the meal allowance, which all parties seemed to 
agree was unworkable.I6s Reluctant to interfere with an electoral 
162. Letter, supra note 161. Walsh advised the Mayor to consider amending Section 
1-30 of the Annual Salary Ordinance (allowing free meals to certain employees while on 
duty) to include "certain female-dominated classes or classes below a certain salary level 
by providing a dollar amount benefit, such as $2.00 per day meal supplement allowance 
while on duty." ld. (emphasis added). 
163. See id. at 2, for an excellent summary of what occurred; see also Beasley, Cut-
ler & Kurtz, Mayor's Ballot Measure; Letter to San Francisco Board of Supervisors I, 1-
2 (Aug. 20, 1985) (excellent background analysis). 
164. See Letter, supra note 161, at 2. 
165.ld. 
166.ld. 
167. See San Francisco, Cal., Proposition E (November 1985). See also supra note 
123 for relevant language. 
168. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Equal Rights Advocate and San Francisco Women 
Lawyers' Alliance, SEIU v. Feinstein, No. 845-936, at 8-11 (S.F. Superior Court, Sept. 18, 
1985). Amici argued that the measure, calling for the repeal of a non-existent "meal 
allowance" proposal, could be easily confused with $8.8 million pay equity fund (part of 
a valid contract between city workers and the Board of Supervisors) by an electorate 
unaware the latter had replaced the controversial "meal allowance" idea. They also char-
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matter, the court denied the injunction.169 Thus, comparable 
worth reached San Francisco's voters disguised as a meal allow-
ance no one seemed to want and a contractual entanglement be-
tween a municipal union and city managers which is also headed 
for the courts.l7° 
This impending court battle illustrates just how fragmented 
the issue of salaries can become and is a good example of what 
one comparable worth analyst has called the "stakes of the ac-
tors."l7l The same author related the "arrival" of comparable 
worth to a reform movement within the civil sector that began 
at the federal level but has also had impact on city govern-
ment.172 She linked this trend within the civil sector to the 
highly politicized manner in which social change generally oc-
curs in this country. She conceived of such change as the prod-
uct of various coalitions and interest groups who come together 
to trade support for various legislative and administrative re-
forms, making their implementation an often piecemeal affair.173 
Her insights help explain the mayor's seemingly contradictory 
positions on comparable worth. 
A close look at city politics in San Francisco in the months 
before Proposition E went on the ballot shows the two parties 
with the most to gain from the defeat of the comparable worth 
ordinance to be the mayor and the Civil Service Commission. 
The mayor's interest in defeating the Board of Supervisors' pay 
equity measure is closely linked to her budget responsibilities 
under the City Charter. By law, the mayor is responsible for 
submitting a balanced budget for each fiscal year.174 Feinstein 
began focusing on this fact months before her repeal measure 
went on the ballot. Both of her vetoes of the Board's pay equity 
package raised the theme of her fiscal responsibilities to the 
acterized Proposition E as an "unconstitutional attempt to breach a valid contract." [d. 
at 14. . 
169. SEIU v. Feinstein, No. 845·936 (S.F. Superior Court, Sept. 18, 1985) (injunc· 
tion den., Sept. 24, 1985). 
170. See supra notes 164·68 and accompanying text for sources of confusion. 
171. E. JOHANSEN, COMPARABLE WORTH: THE MYTH AND THE MOVEMENT 67 (1984). 
See also id. at 52·55. 
172. [d. 
173. [d. at 16·19. 
174. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 25, 1985, at 16, col. 4. 
35
Kaminski: The Market Defense Debate
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986
510 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:475 
city's voters.171i Later, the mayor revealed that, after enjoying a 
$150 million surplus for two years, the city was now facing a $76 
million dollar deficit.176 
Shortly thereafter, the mayor began blaming the Board's 
pay equity package for the deficit. She predicted that massive 
layoffs of city workers were imminent without the repeal of the 
comparable worth ordinance.177 By tying the deficit problem to 
comparable worth, the mayor turned a serious embarrassment to 
her advantage. She accomplished this by persuading voters that 
in voting for repeal, they were voting against massive layoffs and 
for a balanced budget. 
On September 4, 1985, the Ninth Circuit handed down 
AFSCME 11.178 While the mayor expressed regret at the ruling, 
George Agnost, City Attorney, told reporters that he was 
pleased. He also predicted that the Ninth Circuit ruling would 
make it easier for the mayor to repeal the Board's pay equity 
measure.179 More interesting, however, is the City Attorney's 
conception of the City Charter as a kind of accordian, flexible in 
some respects, while extremely rigid in others. Thus, while it al-
lows a wide latitude in making internal salary adjustments to 
the Commission staff, the Charter forbids any consideration of a 
comparable worth standard in setting wages for city workers,180 
according to Agnost. 
175. SEIU Report, supra note 130, 4 app. B. at 2, 6-8; The mayor proposed a $2 
million pay equity plan as an alternative to the measure, which she estimated would cost 
$28 to $30 million. [d. See also San Francisco Chronicle, supra note 174. 
176. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 25, 1985, at I, col. 1. The mayor made the an-
nouncement on September 25, 1985. Given the budget crisis, the mayor characterized the 
measure as "the height of fiscal responsibility." SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 4 app. 
Bat 7. 
177. [d. The same day, Feinstein told the press that "[t]here is no way to avoid $28 
million ... in layoffs with the comparable worth package still in effect ... . "[d. at I, 
col. 1. The city's Budget Analyst predicted at $29 million deficit by 1986-87. In August, 
an update to the report enlarged that figure to $45 million, predicting the deficit by 1986 
unless spending were curbed or new revenue found. [d. at 16, col. 4. 
178. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1401. 
179. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 6, 1985 at 7, col. 4. 
180. 85-2 Op. City Att'y 1 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Opinion]. The opinion con-
cluded: (1) that a charter amendment would be necessary to implement comparable 
worth and (2) that CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53248 (West 1983) did not apply to the City and 
County of San Francisco because it did not set wage through collective bargaining and 
also had "plenary authority" over wage-setting. Opinion, at 1. 
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The City Attorney repeatedly cited section 8.047 of the City 
Charter. That section sets out the procedures to be followed in 
setting wages for San Francisco's Miscellaneous Employees, who 
comprise the majority of the city's labor force.l81 All 7,000 em-
ployees affected by the Board of Supervisor's pay equity ordi-
nance, for example, are considered Miscellaneous Employees.ls2 
Agnost argues that section 8.047 provides detailed and rigid sur-
veying procedures for arriving at the Miscellaneous Employees' 
salaries. Thus, each survey must consider wages prevailing 
among other Bay Area county governments as well as the area's 
private employers for "like work and like service.mss The intrin-
sic worth of these employees' work to the city is therefore totally 
irrelevant and cannot be considered.ls4 
According to the City Attorney, the same provision of the 
Charter does permit the Commission staff much discretion in 
choosing benchmarks, shifting certain occupations from one 
benchmark to another, raising the salaries of certain indexed 
jobs, and any other changes necessary to produce an internal 
alignment of salaries within each city department. lSI> Although 
Agnost claims that the merits of comparable worth are not at 
issue,ls6 it is clear that detailed formulae comparing the worth of 
certain occupations would substantially interfere with the Com-
mission's traditional freedom in wage-setting. In an important 
181. See generally SAN FRANCISCO CITY CHARTER § 8.407. 
182. SEID Report, supra note 130, at 17. The miscellaneous employee classification 
does not include registered nurses, however. Id. 
Id. 
183. See Opinion, supra note 180, at 5-6. 
184. Section 8.407 has the purpose of determining a generally prevail-
ing wage from surveyed jurisdictions for like work and like service. 
The value or worth of the work or service is not a criterion that 
governs the collection of information from the survey jurisdictions 
except in an incidental way as reflected in the surveyed rates. 
Since worth or value of the services to the City is an internal fac-
tor that has no relationship to the generally prevailing rates found 
in the surveyed jurisdictions, it cannot be considered by the Civil 
Service Commission when making internal salary adjustments to 
achieve a generally prevailing wage. 
185. See Opinion, supra note 180, at 1. See supra notes 134-42 and accompanying 
text for an extended discussion of that body's discretionary powers in deciding city and 
county salaries. 
186. San Francisco, Cal., Proposition D (amending San Francisco Charter) (June, 
1986). Under the initiative, for example, section 2.203-2 of the Charter, providing for 
Reappointment of the Employee Relations Director by the Board of Supervisors, would 
be deleted. 
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sense, then, his argument stands for an effort by city managers 
to preserve a civil sector free of all restrictions in many of its 
internal procedures, rather than a direct opposition to the prin-
ciples of comparable worth. 
Events following the November 1985 elections show that ef-
forts to preserve and even widen the Commission's discretionary 
powers are intensifying. An initiative due to be placed on the 
June, 1986 ballot, for example, seeks to streamline that part of 
the Charter dealing with employee relations. If passed, the initi-
ative would shift the supervision of all grievance procedures 
from the Board of Supervisors to the mayor's office. The initia-
tive would also allow the General Manager for Personnel to 
make a large number of other decisions affecting employees 
without going to the voters as presently provided.187 
The initiative effort is not unique to San Francisco, but is 
part of a current, nationwide trend to streamline the civil sector 
by giving its managers unprecedented freedoms. ISS San Fran-
cisco provides an important example of how such efforts are col-
liding with attempts to introduce pay equity for women and mi-
norities. The city's opposition to comparable worth also 
dramatizes the peculiar nature of the public sector, where offi-
cials act both as employers and as implementers of social policy. 
187. Sections 3.662- .663 of the Proposition would establish a Department of Per-
sonnel Administration, whose director would be appointed by the mayor. The former 
and his staff would regulate recruitment, promotion and transfer of city employees; he or 
she would also "establish procedures to review and resolve allegations of discrimination 
on the basis of race, religion, sex, national origin, ethnicity .... " [d. The director would 
also conduct "a comprehensive investigation and survey of basic pay rates . . . in other 
government jurisdictions." [d. at 6. The mayor, rather than the Board of Supervisors 
would provide any "working condition benefits for employees covered" under section 
8.407 and section 8.401. [d. 
188. See Borjas, Wage Determination in the Federal Government: The Role of 
Constituents and Bureaucrats, 88 J. POL. ECON. 1110, 1143 (1980). Borjas points to the 
1978 Civil Service Reform Act as beginning the trend in "relax[ing] . . . the stringent 
rules imposed by the civil service regulations concerning promotion and dismissal of fed-
eral workers. The new law [gave] ... federal agencies wider powers in initiating either 
adverse or favorable personnel actions. . . and should increase the flexibility of bureau-
cratic managers to create ... wage differentials." [d. Borjas also argues that such differ-
entials may also result from the political influence or "clout" of the particular agency 
with the constituents it serves. [d. at 110; see also Los Angeles Times, October 14, 1985, 
at A-4, col. 1, for a Defense Department proposal "to revamp the federal service system 
by replacing the pay and grade scale with a pay-for-performance approach." [d. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Cases such as Bohm v. Hartz, which arise in the private sec-
tor are important in showing what actually motivates some ·em-
ployers conducting market surveys. Such cases are also ideal for 
analysts interested in understanding how several discriminatory 
acts work together to depress the wages of a smaller workforce. 
With painstaking attention to detail, the Bohm dissent proved 
the majority's superficial analysis of Hartz's pay scale and con-
cluded that neither it nor the market survey justifying it were 
legitimate. The dissent's methodology may prove a more subtle 
and reliable supplement to statistical data in separating legiti-
mate uses of market surveys from those violative of Title VII. 
The two AFSCME cases and the current debate in San 
Francisco are important for other reasons. They show that in the 
public sector, pay equity is often lowest in a scale of priorities 
which highlights budgetary concerns. They also illustrate the 
two faces of discrimination: how a set of private traditions si-
lently becomes public policy, and how the public arena twists 
that policy even further, often to the detriment of women. 
Helena Kaminski* 
*Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987. 
39
Kaminski: The Market Defense Debate
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986
